I met Hugo when I was in the first year of the economics Ph.D. program at Iowa. The usual instructor for the second semester microeconomics course was on leave and the department had arranged for Hugo, who was at Northwestern, and Rich Kihlstrom, who was at Illinois, to share teaching the course. Each week, one of them would fly in for a day of intensive instruction. It was a memorable course for both the topics and the enthusiasm of the instructors, and it led to my transfer to Northwestern the following fall. After my first year at Northwestern, Hugo moved to Princeton and I followed informally for part of his first summer there and later, after finishing my coursework with a final quarter physically at Northwestern, as a visiting student at Princeton.
It is hard to describe adequately Hugo's impact as a mentor and friend. Many hours of discussion in his office or while walking about the Princeton area helped to develop not only my research ideas but also my approach to research. Hugo asked the right questions in terms of research topics to pursue. Later, when discussing the tentative results of the research, he again asked the right questions to zero in on the key insights or ideas. Then when discussing written drafts of the work, his questions and comments always brought clarity and precision to the presentation. Hugo treated me not just as a student but as a friend, so I also had the pleasure of interacting frequently with his family.
The topic of my paper, the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis, evolved out of a series of discussions with Hugo concerning imperfect competition. Hugo's interest in imperfect competition at this time was evident from his paper with John Roberts on imperfect competition in general equilibrium. At times, Hugo and I discussed and worked with Charles EUet's spatial model among others, but two questions, about existence of equilibrium (raised in his paper with Roberts) and free (as opposed to exogenously imposed) entry, made the partial equilibrium Cournot model a natural starting point. As soon as the partial equilibrium results became clear, we began to consider the general equilibrium version. This led to several joint papers that viewed the perfectly competitive general equilibrium model as a limit of imperfectly competitive economies with small efficient scale and free entry, starting with "Cournot and Walras Equilihrmm,''Journal of Economic Theory, 1978.
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Despite the fact that the assumptions underlying perfect competition never actually hold, the use of the competitive model, as an idealization, is justified if the predictions of the model approximate the outcomes of situations it is used to represent. In partial equilibrium analysis, this justification is embodied in the " Folk Theorem " which states that if firms are small relative to the market, then the market outcome is approximately competitive. This paper provides a precise statement and proof of the " Folk Theorem " for competitive markets with a single homogeneous good, and free entry and exit. It is shown that if firms are small relative to the market then there is a Cournot equilibrium with free entry; furthermore, any Cournot equilibrium with free entry is approximately competitive. More specifically, if we consider an appropriate sequence of markets in which firms become arbitrarily small relative to the market, then there is a Cournot equilibrium with free entry for all markets in the tail of the sequence, and aggregate equihbrium output converges to perfectly competitive output. If firms have strictly U-shaped average cost curves, then individual firm behaviour converges to competitive behaviour. The treatment of free entry distinguishes this paper from other papers dealing with the " Folk Theorem ", where either the number of firms is exogeneous, ruling out free entry, or free entry is treated as being equivalent to a zero profit condition, ignoring the integer problem that arises when the number of firms is finite but unspecified. Firms may become small relative to the market in two ways: through changes in technology, absolute firm size (the smallest output at which minimum average cost is attained) may become small, or, through shifts in demand, the absolute size of the market (the market demand at competitive price) may become large. We allow both types of changes here, though shifts in demand, especially in the form of replication of the consumer sector, may be more famihar. In his conclusion, Ruffin (1971) presents a verbal argument for the " Folk Theorem " which is based on replication of demand and entry. Hart (1979) , though not concerned with existence, shows that in a general equilibrium model with differentiated products and free entry, equilibria are approximately competitive (Pareto optimal) when consumers have been replicated a sufficient number of times.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 contains the perfectly competitive model and its assumptions. Section 2 contains the assumptions and definitions for the imperfectly competitive model, Section 3 contains an example contrasting the usual treatment of the " Folk Theorem " and the present approach, Section 4 contains the proofs of the main results, and Section 5 contains remarks on the results and indicates how some of the assumptions that are used can be weakened.
SECTION 1
The classical long run perfectly competitive model of a market for a single homogeneous good, where factor prices are constant, can be found in most textbooks which survey microeconomics at any level. All firms have identical technology, and in the long run firms
